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Abstract: 
The Best Interests Standard is a difficult and controversial concept, and its implementation in 
clinical practice faces substantial concerns from conceptual and linguistic points of view.  
By analyzing the underlying premises I conclude in a first step that the often criticized 
inconsistencies is not as much a problem of the concept of best interests itself but rather an 
inevitable consequence of coherent tensions between different values and perspectives in clinical 
practice. Nevertheless by pretending normative statements without the argumentative groundwork 
the term of “best interests” is prone to become empty or rhetorical. For using “best interests” as a 
meaningful concept and to respect and to consider the sometimes conflicting needs, values and 
perspectives in clinical practice I propose a constitutional matrix with three different discourses 
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and four stakeholders. Arguing with the concept of “best interests” therefore implies to 
understand underlying ideologies (1), to delineate a particular area of optimum care and choice 
(2), and to learn about established or needed thresholds (3). Furthermore these three discourses 
are informed, each in a particular manner, by the views of expert (1), parents (2), the child (3) and 
the knowledge of a prospective future person (4). If only one of these considerations is missing 
we either should conceive the concept of “best interests” as a mandate to complete these 
considerations or refrain from using it in our argumentation. As a consequence the best interests 
is not perceived as a particular principle or philosophical argument but as a complex claim to 
assess and to implement multifaceted needs, aims, conditions and arguments concerning a child. 
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Introduction 
 
“The role of staff members in acting in a child’s best interest is similar to that of the parents, but 
the opinions of professionals have greater weight.” [16] 
 
“The most frequent theme (in 89.1% of all interviews) was “doing right by my child,” conveying 
parents’ desire to make decisions in the child’s best interest (…) in an unselfish manner.” [17] 
“Estimating an individual’s best interests indirectly demands placing a value on that life. It 
seems that we are prepared to place less moral value on a human life just born than one that has 
begun to develop attachments.” [5] 
 
“The real question is not so much about identifying which medical alternative represents the best 
interests of the child, but rather about identifying a harm threshold below which parental 
decisions will not be tolerated.” [11] 
 
“(...) due to the variability demonstrated above, the BIS is neither internally nor externally 
consistent.” [23] 
 
The Best Interests Standard is a difficult and controversial concept, and its implementation in 
clinical practice faces substantial concerns from conceptual and linguistic points of view.  
Within this chapter, I aim to present of how a concept of best interests of the child could be 
applied in clinical practice in a consistent manner. I do not defend or question the “best”-language 
itself, which is under critique mainly because of its rhetorical power based on inconsistent or 
normatively weak arguments.[18; 23] Nevertheless I would contest a rash discard of the concept 
of “best interests”. The herein presented approach is essentially shaped by my own daily work as 
a medical doctor in pediatrics and it is informed by excerpts from semi-structured interviews with 
health care professionals conducted from 2008 to 2012 including a comprehensive review on 
medical literature regarding the use of best interests. [25]  Although I hope to advance the efforts 
of promoting the well-being of the child, I’m well aware of the limits of the applied methods, 
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which do neither have the normative strength to confirm nor to discard the best interests standard 
as a leading concept in pediatrics. But my intention is a different one. Much more I will argue for 
a less normative but nevertheless comprehensive idea of the concept of best interests. Thereby 
speaking of “best interests” does not imply a normative principle but rather a motive to sharpen 
our perspective for a continuing attempt to understand what we use to call “children”, what we 
think is “best” for them and to what “principles” we should adhere to in our efforts to respect the 
child and its family.  
  
A. Premises on what is in the best interests of a child in clinical practice 
Recommendations concerning the best interests of the child tend to contain vague and sometimes 
conflicting interpretations. In clinical practice, however, best interests are applied on a regular 
basis and normative statements in a particular situation usually are ready-to-hand.[24] As 
indicated by the opening quotes there are some variability in talking about best interests, which 
sometimes lead to the conclusion that the concept of best interests “is neither internally nor 
externally consistent”.[23] To have an idea of differing interpretations, which may lead to 
inconsistency, I will start with presenting some important underlying assumptions and premises, 
which I repeatedly found in interviews and daily practice. 
 
1. The child as a subject subjected to parental authority 
Parents are widely seen responsible for their minor children, including decision-making 
concerning their child’s development and health. The associated authority is either based on the 
assumption that parents do qualify best to respect their child’s needs or on the overarching value 
of the family and the underlying assumption of an “intimate relationship”.[13] According to the 
first perspective parental authority is an implication of the best interests of the child, according to 
the second perspective best interests of the child is an implication of the value of a family. In 
clinical practice both perspectives are important. Therefore, parents do hold the authority to act in 
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ways that are not necessarily for the child’s good (e.g. change of residence of a family due to 
personal but not financially compelling reasons) but at the same time do have responsibilities 
concerning the needs of an individual child, independent of efforts to preserve and enhance the 
family as a hole (e.g. the prohibition of child-labour for increasing the family income). In short, 
there is much, but not endless room for parental authority.  
Of particular interest for pediatric ethics is the notion that parental authority not only includes the 
power to make decisions on behalf of the minor child but also the decision of how much 
participation parents like to share with their minor offspring. The question about the point, where 
a child receives authority in decision-making hence depends on one hand on the child’s 
competence to make a decision but on the other hand largely on the parents’ concept of 
participation, education, and what for them seems best for the child. The increasing awareness of 
the burdens among children with cancer who are not sufficiently informed might have changed 
the relationship between medical professionals, parents and the child during the last years. But 
current literature still gives little guidance about the implication of parental authority in clinical 
practice. However, from a clinician’s point of view the question of parental authority also implies 
the question of how parents can be supported in applying authority in difficult situations. Using 
the example of differences (or disorders) of sex development (DSD), also called intersex, we are 
just starting to learn how important it is to strengthen the parents’ competence in talking about 
difficult issues with their minor children and exert authority in complex clinical situations.[27]  
 
2. The child and its family as a relational unit 
As mentioned above the intimate family can be a justification for parental authority. At the same 
time the assumption that the parents and the child are a relational unit with significant influences 
on the development and well-being of children is a cornerstone of the concept of best interests.[8] 
It is a common and central claim that the patient’s family and the health care team must work 
cooperatively with each other and communicate effectively to provide the best patient care.[10] 
Streuli	  JC	   Page	  6	  of	  19	  The	  Concept	  of	  Best	  Interests	  in	  Clinical	  Practice	  	  
	  
Based on early research concerning the impact of bonding, pediatricians see the child’s outcome 
regarding physical and emotional health, including cognitive and social functioning, strongly 
related to the (patchwork) family’s functioning as a unit.[4] A significant inability of providing 
certain conditions for an effective bonding between the parent and the child can lead to protective 
measures against parental authority. An example could be seen in a single parent with severe 
depression and repeated hospitalizations, who has not been able to give sufficient love and 
attendance to the child without support from a foster family. In another example of an 
unconscious dying child with acute worsening conditions the premise of relational units may be 
used for balancing the parents’ need for having some more time with their dying child against the 
inclination not to prolong distress by invasive procedures like intubation for mechanical 
ventilation.  
Moreover, the values within a relational unit also provide guidance in situations, where the harm 
principle as a base for child protection measures, as proposed by Diekema, might not be 
sufficient. In the example of a depressive single parent, the need of the child for emotional 
warmth and security may demand certain supportive measures independent of the mere 
quantification of resulting harm, because harm in this particular situation may be of rather 
hypothetical consequence. In my experience the act of fostering the relationship to a continuing 
(professional or personal) person of trust usually cannot be done by a court but needs a long-term 
relationship to the child and its environment (e.g. school teacher, psychologist, social worker 
etc.). In the second example of a severely ill and unconscious child the principle of do-no-harm is 
also of great significance but not the sole argument. Although one could certainly argue that 
parents prima facie do not have the right to demand invasive, potentially harmful and medically 
not indicated treatments, there are other normative aspects than solely the harm principle. 
Moreover, the harm principle itself is a multifaceted concept as shown below. 
 
3. The child as a vulnerable person 
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It is a frequently heard premise that children are characterized by their exceptional vulnerability. 
Its source can be grouped into primary and secondary origins. Primary origins of the vulnerability 
of the child are related to the absolute or relative child-like weakness, frailty, and immaturity, 
which objectively make the child dependent on others in particular situations. Vulnerability in 
pediatric hospital settings, however, is not just bound to primary biological and psychological 
constitutions of the child but also to the imbalance of power between adults’ and minors’ 
concepts, spaces, and bodies. Drawing a line between adulthood and childhood involves the 
danger of a certain “adultism”, which is associated with a conscious or unconscious control of 
children by demanding obedience and conformity, independent of evolving capacities to 
participate in a process of decision-making.[6] This may lead to the denial of rights and, 
subsequently, to the accentuation of vulnerability.  
An extreme form of such secondary origins of vulnerability was proposed in 1964 by Solnit and 
Green under the name of the “vulnerable child syndrome”, observed in families which experience 
the premature death of a close person, recovery from a nearly missed death in infant- or 
childhood, or burdening situations during pregnancy. In the absence of a biomedical or 
psychological disorder in the child, the authors reported overemphasized and secondarily 
enforced vulnerability associated with pathologic separation problems, overuse of medical care 
services, and overprotectiveness.[15] 
 
4. The child as a participating person with evolving capacities 
As children develop and acquire enhanced competencies, there is a continuously reduced need for 
direction, and consecutively a greater capacity to take responsibility for decisions affecting their 
lives. Speaking of best interests, there is always a need to balance the understanding of children 
as active agents in their own lives, with their own understanding of value and happiness, entitled 
to be listened to, respected, and granted increasing autonomy in the exercise of rights, while they 
are also entitled to protection in accordance with their relative immaturity and youth. The concept 
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of evolving capacities, introduced in Article 5 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
provides the basis for an appropriate respect for children’s agency, without exposing them 
prematurely to the full responsibilities normally associated with adulthood.[9; 21] There is little 
literature about the relation between the best interests of the child and autonomy, but they are 
sometimes believed to be oppositional, as the risks resulting from autonomous choice could be 
contrary to the child’s best interests.[22] Other authors do not share these concerns and draw a 
strong link between the ability to understand, communicate, and value certain choices and the 
ability to cope with the burdens of illness and its treatments.[3] Both perspectives, however, do 
have in common that they perceive the acknowledgment and support of evolving capacities as a 
delicate and important issue, while an all-or-nothing discussion between the autonomous versus 
the vulnerable child would hardly reflect reality. For example, in clinical practice there is a 
widespread awareness of the importance of play and toys in a child-friendly clinical environment, 
acknowledging the value of childhood itself. At the same time plays and toys, including 
children’s book are frequently used to explain concepts and obtain opinions of topics such as 
chemotherapy, side effects, suffering or death - topics, which are in the perspective of an adult 
typically reserved for the adult world. However, we always must be aware that autonomy and 
evolving capacities are concepts coined by an adult understanding of competence and decision-
making. Nevertheless there are a myriad of specific competences of a child to discover, to respect 
and to build on. While some competences might be important and valuable in childhood but 
useless or even debilitating for adulthood, and vice versa. On one hand this draws a connecting 
line to a particular form of vulnerability and the problem of “adultism” mentioned above, on the 
other hand it leads us to the last premise of the child and the prospect of its future state.  
 
5. The child and the prospective future person 
Normative statements based on adult concepts may conflict with a value system of a child. 
While children in some aspects do have the capacity and the right for having their very own value 
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system, the common adult perspective (above introduced as “adultism”) typically argues that 
children only have an incomplete value systems closely related to still evolving capacities and 
limited life experiences. A value system, according to this perspective, is perceived as mature as 
soon it coincides with a value system and the underlying capacities of a “fully developed” adult. 
As so often, when two extremes are opposed, both do have at least some weight: While 
professionals try to respect the child’s own perspective and values, it is also necessary to consider 
in some regards the future person with different phases of life. This happens by caring for the 
child’s health and education based on principles such as protection and provision. [26] While the 
children’s rights approach combines the principles of protection and provision with the demand 
for participation, thereby including the respect of evolving capacities, Feinberg’s well-known 
account of the child’s right to an open future focuses almost exclusively on the preservation of 
prospective opportunities in later life, with the aim of “[sending the child] out into the adult world 
with as many open opportunities as possible, thus maximizing his chances for self-fulfillment.” 
[14] While Feinberg’s perspective certainly is compatible with the respect of evolving capacities, 
as far as open opportunities also depend on capacities learned earlier in childhood, the open future 
account is still highly prescriptive, fully dominating opportunities in childhood by future 
opportunities in a hypothetical state of adulthood1.  There is, however, another aspect of the child 
and its prospective phases of life, which is less intrusive but equally powerful for clinical 
practice: the perspective of evidence-based medicine, which urges professionals to collect and 
implement data and insights from mid- and long-term results. A particularly difficult example can 
be found again in the treatment of children with disorders of differences of sex development, 
where recent studies shed a critical light on the outcome of surgical sex assignment and the 
absence of follow-up data for many years. [19] Therefore, returning to interpretations of best 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Feinberg’s	  approach	  fails	  to	  show	  why	  the	  open	  future	  argument	  is	  applicable	  on	  children	  (e.g.	  desires	  and	  whishes	  in	  childhood	  should	  be	  sacrificed	  for	  the	  opportunities	  of	  an	  adult	  person	  in	  her	  thirties)	  but	  not	  on	  adults	  (e.g.	  desires	  and	  whishes	  of	  a	  person	  in	  her	  twenties	  should	  be	  sacrificed	  for	  the	  opportunities	  of	  an	  adult	  person	  in	  her	  sixties)	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interests, I would argue, that the collection and consideration of data regarding long-term 
outcome after childhood is an essential part of the best interests of a child.  
 
B. The triad of best interests in clinical practice 
The short and incomplete summary of five premises suggests that inconsistencies are not 
primarily part of an inconsistent concept but the (inevitable) consequence of tensions between 
different values and perspectives in clinical practice. Medical indication is bound to a medical 
professional’s opinion. However, daily care and choice reach far beyond medically indicated 
therapy or support. Professionalism in clinical practice embraces innovative approaches of 
planning, delivery and the evaluation of health care grounded in a mutually beneficial partnership 
among patients, families, and providers that recognize the child’s needs, the child’s evolving 
capacities, and the importance of the family in the child’s life.[1; 21] In a nutshell, this is what the 
best interests of the child in clinical practice are aiming for: a well-considered implementation of 
multifaceted needs, aims and conditions.  
The here presented concept has strong similarities with the theoretical concept of Loretta 
Kopelman.[20] Kopelman defines the Best Interests Standard as an umbrella term, by identifying 
its employment, first, as a threshold for intervention and judgment (as in child abuse and neglect 
rulings), second, as an ideal to establish policies or prima facie duties, and, third, as a standard of 
reasonableness. According the my view based on the available empirical data Kopelman’s 
concept of a triad is capturing the needs and requirements regarding interactions with children 
and their families best. In practice, the best interests of the child are not limited to a punctual 
approach of solving conflicts and averting harm, but deeply related with a comprehensive 
understanding of the child’s need to develop within a functional system of caregivers and 
heteronomous as well autonomous capacities. In the following three paragraphs I will show a 
way, which captures the best interests of the child best, from an empirical and philosophical 
perspective. The here presented triad, however, slightly differs from what Kopelman earlier 
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proposed. The following approach embraces and modifies also the classic definition of Brock and 
Buchanan, which conceives the best interests standard literally as a maximal best solution, as well 
as a proposal by Diekema, who argues for interventions against parental authority exclusively 
based on the harm standard. [7; 12; 23] After presenting central premises, on which discussions 
regarding the best interests of the child are based, I will next present three different but 
complementary discourses from which statements regarding the best interests and based on the 
proposed premises arise.  
 
1. The optimum 
 The main discourse from a clinical point of view could also be called a standard of optimum care 
and choice. Finding an optimum is a process, which takes place within a continuously changing 
field of multiple choices and different forms of care. The discourse about the optimum is 
characterized by changing perspectives, needs, and capacities of a child and its environment, 
including its family and a particular health care system. The idea of an optimum is based on the 
observation that decisions in clinical practice often refer to a level of effort that strives to 
maximize the benefit for a particular child over a long time period without significantly 
decreasing the ability of the family or its environment to support the continuation of a certain 
level of care and choice. Although a particular patient might be the center of considerations, the 
optimum care and choice is based on the premise of the family as a unit and therefore takes all 
family members into account. The optimum typically corresponds to an effort level somewhere 
between the maximally best solution mentioned by Brock and Buchanan and the “good-enough 
parenting” mentioned by Winnicott [7; 28]. Most health care professionals I interviewed were in 
accordance that “just” good-enough or suboptimal care or choices would not be in the best 
interests of the child and should be encountered by prevention or additional support. 
Nevertheless, the standard of optimum care and choice reigns on the important role of parents in 
deciding on behalf of a child, which is not yet or no longer capable of deciding for itself. Whether 
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a certain care or choice is rather “good-enough” or “maximally the best” therefore depends on the 
mutually beneficial partnership among patients, families, and providers formed by a dynamic 
process within the triangle of the patient, the parents, and the responsible professionals.  
 
2. The threshold value 
Statements considering a threshold value refer to situations where a certain stakeholder loses its 
significance in favor of interdisciplinary, democratically legitimated expert groups (e.g. child 
protections services, ethics commitees and/or courts). Threshold values of best interests are 
primarily based on the principle of non-maleficence and distinguish acceptable from unacceptable 
courses of action or consequences. While the best interests as an ideal or an optimum are 
represented by a multitude of differing principles, the threshold value is primarily guided by a 
negative definition of best interests focusing on the prevention and/or protection from harm. As a 
consequence, the effect of threshold values is limited to situations where significant and obvious 
harm occurs or very likely will occur. Therefore every optimum is surrounded by certain 
boarders, which demarcate an area, where parents, in relation with the minor patient and the 
supporting professionals do have a certain freedom to act in regard of their child’s need and 
capacities.  
The interviewed specialists were well aware of the difficulty of defining such threshold values 
and the nuances involved. Whether the harm principle should be the leading argument or just one 
argument inter alia, will not be discussed here. However, contrary to individual and close 
partnerships within the area of optimum care and choice, the threshold values should be based on 
well-considered resolutions by transdisciplinary working groups, ethic committees, courts, and 
other democratically enacted authorities. Although the threshold value as a part of the best 
interests of the child governs the limits of parental consent, parents have an important role in 
determining what a threshold value is. As a consequence, a threshold value is closely associated 
with the assisted search for an optimum. By defining threshold values based on children’s rights 
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and modern child protection services, it became clear that harm to a child can not simply be seen 
as a sum of threshold crossings but also as a problem requiring knowledge about coping strategies 
and the resilience of a child’s environment to identify the underlying causes of harmful behaviors 
or conditions. For example, the best interests of a child living within a family of Jehovah's 
Witness would be insufficiently covered by only discussing the limits of parents’ authority in 
deciding about life-saving transfusion in an emergency situation (threshold discourse). By making 
a substantiated decision against the parents’ and/or the child’s will, the best interests of the child 
are not yet fully considered. Dependent on particular situations professionals should strive for an 
optimum in how parents and the child can be prepared, informed and supported in advance and 
after a potential transfusion. This brings me to a third discourse on which the best interests of the 
child rely.  
 
3. The discourse of ideology 
Ideology is the most private and individual but also most controversial aspect of the best interests 
of a child. Ideology is based on particular ideas of what makes life and decisions good and right, 
independent of democratically legitimated, well-argued, or evidence-based resolutions within the 
discourse of thresholds. Similar to its origin in the platonic idea, the ideologies exist as archetypes 
of which only shadows or certain excerpts become visible for the observer. Considering the best 
interests of a child implies a process of perception, comprehension and translation, and of 
underlying ideologies in families; but also in health care. Medical professionals should always 
bear in mind that definitions of what is health and healthy are nevertheless bound to particular 
perspectives and ideologies. There is however no reason to end up in multicultural relativism. 
Other than the critically reflected optimum and threshold discourses the discourse of ideology is 
not necessarily subject of normative statements and judgment. To implement personal and 
sometimes controversial ideologies is mainly a way to show respect for someone. Moreover it 
facilitates planning and delivering optimal care and a choice. Therefore, like in the before 
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mentioned family belonging to Jehovah's Witness the best interests of the child demand a 
consideration of the families’ ideologies as a starting point for further reflection on the optimum 
and certain threshold values. This statement is sufficiently vague so that its value in reducing 
child/parent conflict 
 
C. Implications 
If there is a simple message about best interests in clinical practice, then certainly that best 
interests are not simple. They are multifaceted, dynamic and sophisticated. However, in contrast 
to a widely held belief the concept of best interests does not itself balance principles, rights and 
needs of children and parents but describe and integrate them on several levels or discourses. [2] 
Basically it ensures a well-considered implementation of the multifaceted needs, aims and 
conditions. Table 1 offers a matrix, which has to be filled with relevant data, necessary to 
incorporate these needs, aims and conditions. The concept of best interests thereby does neither 
represent a particular argument, principle or philosophy nor does it come to use only for 
situations where the child has no competence at all. For using “best interests” as a meaningful 
concept it is necessary to differentiate between the discourses of ideology, optimum and threshold 
based on different perspectives resulting from premises such as parental authority and the 
evolving capacities of the child. In practical terms this means that a decision on a threshold value 
made by a child protection service, for instance against the preference of religious parents who 
reject blood transfusions, cannot be claimed as being in the best interests of the child without 
aiming at the same time to install a relationship between the child, the parents, and the 
professionals. Then, and maybe only then, it is possible to learn about the underlying ideology 
and to offer at least the possibility of sincere reflection on the optimum based on different options 
(such as overriding parental authority, mechanical blood cell-saver with support by a religious 
advisor or a step-wise transition to a less fundamental interpretation of religious commands). 
Under true time pressure, a treatment can be rightly enforced based on a (provisional) juridical 
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decree but the claim of the concept of best interests doesn’t end there. The child has a right to be 
the subject of a comprehensive assessment, which requires considerations not only of a single 
time point of a particular intervention or a single principle, but also of subsequent questions and 
problems regarding the consequences of a certain decision.  
As a consequence, there should be no use of the term before trying, firstly, to understand 
underlying ideologies, secondly, to delineate a particular area of optimum care and choice, and, 
thirdly, to learn about established or needed thresholds. If only one of these three considerations 
is missing we should either conceive the concept of “best interests” as a mandate to complete 
these considerations or refrain from using it. 
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Table 1. A matrix of “best interests” 
 
 
         Ideology  Optimum Threshold 
Experts (...)1 (...)2,3 (...)4 
Parents (...)1 (...)2,3 (...)4 
Children (...)1 (...)2,3 (...)4 
Future person  (...)1 (...)2,3 (...)4 
1Assess, communicate and respect individual values and opinions 
2Consider content, such as development, feeling of security, quality of life, bodily integrity  
3Discuss inter- and transdisciplinary  
4Elaborate thresholds with transparent and democratically legitimated working groups, 
commissions, and courts 
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